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In the past twenty years, the United States Supreme Court has
meandered through the criminal process, opting in some cases for
strict rules to guide the police and the courts, while establishing in
other cases flexible and amorphous standards. An excellent illus-
tration of this adjudicatory dichotomy is provided by comparing
the strict litany of procedural rights in Miranda v. Arizona,1 which
must be recited to a suspect prior to custodial interrogation,2 with
the fluctuating reasonableness-balancing analysis maturing in
Terry v. Ohio.8 This disparity in the Court's reaction to law en-
forcement activities reflects a judicial belief in both the need to
provide hard-and-fast guidelines and the necessity to maintain
flexibility through a case-by-case determination of the reasonable-
ness of particular police practices.
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University. B.B.A., J.D., University of Iowa.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Id. at 444.
3. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Supreme Court actually initiated direct use of the fourth
amendment reasonableness clause one year prior to Terry in the companion cases of Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), in
which the Court relied on the reasonableness language to adopt the concept of an adminis-
trative search warrant which was issuable on less than traditional probable cause.
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Historically, the Supreme Court has imposed a strict rule on the
states either to insure effective constitutional control over local op-
eration of the criminal justice system4 or to promote consistency
among jurisdictions. 5 Recently, however, a new goal of rule-ori-
ented adjudication appears to have emerged which is aimed at pro-
viding guidance to the police concerning permissible investigatory
practices so that constitutional violations and hence operation of
the exclusionary rule can be avoided. Two factors seem to have
coalesced to create the new rule orientation. First, the feeling per-
sists that fourth amendment doctrine should be expressed in the
form of clear, precise rules that are easily applied by the police in
routine law enforcement activities.' Although the case-by-case ap-
proach may retain needed flexibility, its amorphous nature pro-
vides little guidance to the police as to what investigatory practices
4. An illustration of this control is Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), in which
the Supreme Court held the sixth amendment applicable to the states and required the
appointment of counsel for indigents in all felony cases. Prior to Gideon, the provision of
counsel was governed by the due process fundamental fairness standard, which required a
case-by-case determination of the need for an appointed attorney. See Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942), overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Supreme Court
overruled Betts because of the failure of the state courts to apply the fundamental fairness
approach fairly and equitably.
See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which dealt with the problem of custo-
dial interrogation by requiring that law enforcement officers give suspects certain warnings
prior to custodial questioning.
5. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Although Mapp can be viewed as an effort to
impose constitutional control on local law enforcement, its primary thrust was to make such
control uniform throughout the states by the adoption of a mandatory federal exclusionary
remedy applicable to fourth amendment violations. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
in which the Court held the fourth amendment applicable to the states by virtue of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the majority nevertheless refused to apply the
federal exclusionary remedy of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), to the states.
338 U.S. at 33. The Court in Wolf felt that the states should be permitted to experiment
with the appropriate remedy for fourth amendment violations. Twelve years later, however,
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court recognized the inadequacy of other reme-
dies and the trend in the states toward adoption of the Weeks rule and, consequently, held
the exclusionary rule applicable to the states as necessary to provide uniform and adequate
constitutional protection. 367 U.S. at 655-56.
6. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 426-27 (1981), overruled, United States v.
Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458-59 (1981), modified,
United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235
(1973); LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures": The
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 127, 141-42; Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case
Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CraM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 433
(1967).
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will be viewed retrospectively as reasonable on balance with the
individual interest affected.'
The second factor that coalesced to create rule-oriented adjudi-
cation in the criminal process is the desire by some to engraft a
"good faith" exception onto the federal exclusionary remedy.'
7. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 456-60 (1981).
8. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has gone as far as any court
in adopting such a good faith rule. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th
Cir.) (en banc) (Gee & Vance, J.J., alternative holding for a separate majority), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1127 (1981). See also People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1, 422 N.E.2d 537, 439 N.Y.S.2d
877 (1981) (adopting a good faith standard for testing the propriety of consent searches
authorized by third parties); Richmond v. Commonwealth, 29 Clam. L. RPR. 2529 (Ky. Ct.
App., July 31, 1981) (application of good faith rationale to evidence seized under a techni-
cally deficient warrant).
Arguably, the United States Supreme Court also has relied on the good faith approach in
upholding searches in certain cases. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40 (1979), in
which the Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule to a search undertaken pursuant to
an unconstitutional ordinance. The majority reasoned that an officer could not be required
to anticipate that a court subsequently would hold the evidence unconstitutional, and conse-
quently the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule would not be served in such cases.
443 U.S. at 38. In United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), the Court refused to apply
one of its border search decisions retroactively under the theory that the border patrol could
not have anticipated the Court's holding, and thus the past conduct of the border patrol
would not have been deterred by threat of the exclusionary sanction. 422 U.S. at 538-39. In
dissent, Justice Brennan expressed the concern that this holding foreshadowed the adoption
of a bad faith standard for the exclusion of evidence. Id. at 551 (Brennan, J., dissenting). At
least one Justice has openly advocated a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, see
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538-42 (1976) (White, J., dissenting), and at least three other
Justices apparently would favor such an approach. See California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916,
928 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., dissenting from the denial of a stay)
(would consider whether, and to what extent, the exclusionary rule of Weeks should be
retained); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496-502 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-12 (1975) (Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., concurring in part).
In addition, Justice O'Connor has indicated that she might vote in favor of a good faith
standard; her vote would provide the necessary five-Justice majority for such a rule. See
Nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 77-78, 195 (1981). Although a majority of the Court recently re-
fused to adopt a good faith exception in a case arising in Alabama, that particular case
involved an illegal arrest and a subsequent confession in which the conduct of the police
clearly violated one of the Court's established precedents. See Taylor v. Alabama, 102 S. Ct.
2664 (1982). The facts in Taylor thus were not ripe for serious consideration and adoption
of the good faith approach.
The Court now has squarely positioned itself to decide the question of engrafting a good
faith exception onto the exclusionary rule. A case recently was reargued on March 1, 1983
on the issue of whether the exclusionary rule should be modified by a good faith standard.
See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982) (mem.), supra notes 202-21 and accompanying
text.
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Under this proposal, application of the exclusionary rule would be
limited to cases in which police officers intentionally or recklessly
violated constitutional rights. Evidence obtained in a reasonable,
good faith belief in the permissibility of the activity in question
would be admissible despite the fact that constitutional rights may
have been violated.
A distinction based on the good or bad faith of law enforcement
officers creates the need for precision in the standards that govern
police activities because such standards would make bad faith
more readily detectable. Definite rules, established in advance and
clearly indicating to the police what can and cannot be done within
the limits of their constitutional authority, make a bad faith stan-
dard for application of the exclusionary rule practicable. Whereas
both a fluctuating reasonableness criterion9 and rules hedged with
a variety of caveats make a bad faith standard impossible to ad-
minister, police violation of bright-line rules presumptively would
establish bad faith and thus would make a standard based on bad
faith more attractive.
The United States Supreme Court's current exclusive focus on
the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule1" suggests that a
good faith exception to the rule's application may be near adop-
9. See Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the Legitimate Expectation of Privacy, 34
VAND. L. , v. 1289, 1296-97 (1981).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (court's use of its supervisory
power to exclude evidence held improper when defendant lacked standing to invoke fourth
amendment exclusionary rule); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (illegally ob-
tained evidence held admissible to impeach defendant's testimony given in response to
proper cross-examination when the evidence did not squarely contradict defendant's testi-
mony on direct examination); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (automobile passengers
possessed no fourth amendment protection against police search of the owner's vehicle);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (federal habeas corpus jurisdiction limited when state
provided full and fair review of fourth amendment claims); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433 (1976) (exclusionary rule held inapplicable to federal civil tax suit); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (exclusionary rule held inapplicable to grand jury proceed-
ings); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (standing required to challenge ad-
missibility of evidence obtained by electronic surveillance); United States v. Schipani, 435
F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971) (consideration of illegally obtained
evidence in sentencing process held not improper). See also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971) (statements obtained in violation of Miranda held admissible for impeachment
purposes); Burkoff, The Court That Devoured the Fourth Amendment: Triumph of an In-
consistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 On. L. REV. 151 (1979).
[Vol. 24:335
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tion." The policy goal of discouraging police disrespect for consti-
tutional standards through the exclusion of evidence from criminal
trials arguably has little application to honest mistakes. To the ex-
tent that law enforcement personnel subjectively believe that they
are following the commands of the fourth amendment, their con-
duct will not be affected by the exclusion of evidence from criminal
trials.'2 In terms of deterrence, the most the exclusionary rule can
accomplish is to encourage good faith efforts on the part of the
police to comply with fourth amendment requirements. The exclu-
sion of evidence in the case of a good faith effort to comply will
encourage, at best, only greater care in the implementation of
search and seizure rules. But when the fourth amendment never-
theless is violated by officers acting with a good faith belief in the
lawfulness of their conduct, the exclusionary provision is superflu-
ous in discouraging such conduct. 3 The threat of the exclusion of
the evidence obtained simply does not control police behavior in
these cases.1
Bypassing the response to this deterrence notion by those who
oppose a good faith approach, 5 implementation of any such excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule remains highly problematic. Good
faith is an elusive concept. Its adoption as a workable standard is
complicated by at least two major idiosyncracies. First, good faith
can be evaluated from either a subjective or objective perspective,
both of which suffer from defects. Accurate subjective evaluation is
11. See supra note 8. The Supreme Court's decisions that refuse to apply the exclusion-
ary rule on the theory that no deterrent effect will be achieved provide a foundation for the
adoption of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See supra note 10.
12. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 846 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1127 (1981); Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Excep-
tion to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978).
13. It has been argued, on the contrary, that the exclusion of evidence seized in good faith
discourages the police from taking chances, and that a good faith exception whl encourage
the police to test the limits of the rule, thereby increasing the frequency of fourth amend-
ment violations. See Peltier v. United States, 422 U.S. 531, 559 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); LaFave, The Fourth Amendment In An Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright-Lines"
and "Good Faith", 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 358-59 (1982).
14. Even though the exclusion of evidence seized reasonably and in good faith will have
no effect on the behavior of the individual officer involved, this ignores the educational ef-
fect and controlling influence such an exclusion may have in the future on officers in similar
situations. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365, 431-32 (1981).
15. See supra note 14.
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virtually impossible;"6 yet, objective analysis may be equally inac-
curate because it deals with a retrospective view of what should
have been in the mind of the reasonable actor. Police encounters,
by their very nature, do not lend themselves to this type of objec-
tive analysis because they tend to be highly charged, emotional,
and spontaneous events. Thus, objective evaluation may not iden-
tify those situations actually involving bad faith either because a
cold, retrospective analysis will ignore the realities of police work
or, conversely, because undue deference may be given to the vola-
tile nature of the occupation. A case-by-case determination of good
faith based on an objective analysis consequently will not accu-
rately distinguish situations in which the officer's conduct was
deterrable from those in which it was not.
A second problem facing the adoption of a good faith approach
is the ambiguous nature of many fourth amendment standards.
This inherent ambiguity results in situations where police officers
may be unsure of the legality of their actions and thus do not act
either in good or bad faith.
The administrative problems with the good faith standard no
doubt have contributed to the refusal of the United States Su-
preme Court to adopt it. Recently, however, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals adopted a good faith exception to the exclusion-
ary rule,1" and the Supreme Court appears poised to follow suit."8
16. The determination of an officer's state of mind solely from his testimony may not be
credible. Similarly, focusing on his statements at the time of the occurrence may not be
helpful because such statements may not exist, they may be ambiguous, or the source of the
statements, who very often will be the criminal defendant, may be unreliable. For an exam-
ple of the kind of rigorous analysis necessary to gain any insight into an officer's subjective
state of mind when conducting a search, see Mertens & Waasserstrom, supra note 14, at 417-
23.
17. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127
(1981). See also People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1, 422 N.E.2d 537, 439 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1981)
(adopting a good faith standard for testing the propriety of consent searches authorized by
third parties); Richmond v. Commonwealth, 29 CraM. L. RPm 2529 (Ky. Ct. App., July 31,
1981) (application of good faith rationale to evidence seized under a technically deficient
warrant); supra note 8.
18. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982) (mem.), supra notes 202-21 and accompa-
nying text. See also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (adopting an objective good
faith standard in the area of Miranda interrogation); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31
(1979) (upholding an arrest and search undertaken pursuant to an unconstitutional ordi-
nance on the theory that the officers could not have anticipated the subsequent invalidation
of the statute and therefore acted in good faith reliance on it); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
[Vol. 24:335340
1983] GOOD FAITH AND THE EXCLUSIONARY REMEDY
This renewed interest in good faith violations may be due to the
belief that the problems in distinguishing good and bad faith can
be largely eliminated and the rule made manageable by the adop-
tion of bright-line rules to guide the police. Bad faith then would
be objectively determinable by a failure of law enforcement per-
sonnel to comply with the clear standards. Whether by design or
coincidental discovery, the Supreme Court seems to have recog-
nized this potential of rule-oriented decision-making with respect
to the superimposition of a good faith limitation on the operation
of the exclusionary remedy. This judicial realization, coupled with
recent legislative and executive interest in the good faith ap-
proach, 19 indicates that this form of analysis is on the fourth
amendment horizon.
This Article does not propose to debate the advisability of en-
grafting a good faith exception onto the exclusionary rule. That
task already has been accomplished.20 This Article, instead, will
387 (1977) (finding sixth amendment violation partly on basis of the unlawful motive of
interrogating officer); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (refusal to apply a border
search decision retroactively because of good faith reliance by border patrol agents on the
federal statutory and decisional law in effect at the time of their actions). Although a major-
ity of the Court recently refused to adopt a good faith exception, the refusal came in a case
involving an illegal arrest and subsequent confession when the police conduct involved
clearly violated one of the Court's established precedents, which would have made a finding
of good faith somewhat difficult. See Taylor v. Alabama, 102 S. Ct. 2664 (1982). See also
supra note 8.
19. Attorney General William French Smith's Task Force on Violent Crime recommended
that Congress adopt a good faith exception. See ATroRNEY G~ms'S TASK FoRce. ON VIO-
LENT CRME, FINAL REPORT 56-57 (1981). Senator DeConcini of Arizona introduced a bill in
Congress which would forbid the exclusion of evidence in federal courts unless the court
found, as a matter of law, based upon "all of the circumstances," that the violation was
"intentional or substantial." S. 101, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981). Additionally, several state
legislatures are considering enacting a good faith exception, and Colorado already has en-
acted one. COLO. Rxv. STAT. § 16-3-308 (1981).
20. See Ball, supra note 12; Bernardi, The Exclusionary Rule: Is a Good Faith Standard
Needed to Preserve a Liberal Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 30 DEPAuL L.
REv. 51 (1980); Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L.
REV. 929, 952 (1965); LaFave, supra note 13; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 14; Sun-
derland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional Principle, 69 J. CRn. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 141 (1978); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?,
50 Tx. L. REv., 736, 740 (1972); Note, The Proposed Good Faith Test for Fourth Amend-
ment Exclusion Compared to the § 1983 Good Faith Defense: Problems and Prospects, 20
ARIz. L. R.v. 915 (1978); Comment, Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith Exception - The Fifth
Circuit's Approach in United States v. Williams, 15 GA. L. REv. 487, 498-503 (1981); 34
VAND. L. REv. 213, 226-31 (1981); 55 WASH. L. Rev. 849, 861-70 (1980).
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show that bright-line rules cannot solve the problems inherent in
the good faith notion, and that bright-line rules operating in con-
junction with a good faith exception to the exclusion of evidence
are unlikely to provide any relief from the current Supreme
Court's inclination to interpret narrowly the fourth amendment.
First, the suggestion that clear-cut rules can make a good faith
standard administerable through an objective evaluation of rule
compliance is both optimistic and misleading. Actual bright-line
rules, which can be applied easily to varying factual situations, are
difficult to draft. Two cases decided at the end of the Supreme
Court's 1980 Term provide excellent illustrations of this point."
Even if clear-cut rules could be formulated in some areas, litigation
would simply be diverted from rule violation, which would pre-
sumptively establish bad faith, to other areas of uncertainty not
foreclosed by a good faith analysis, such as whether exigent cir-
cumstances existed or whether the officers involved acted under a
reasonable mistake as to the operative facts. The possible interplay
between the formulation of bright-line rules and the good faith ap-
proach also works a kind of paradox. Rather than adopt clear rules
to facilitate the operation of the good faith standard, courts might
instead determine whether the law enforcement activity fell within
the realm of reasonableness and was therefore in good faith. Thus,
courts never would formulate categorical rules for future occasions.
Despite the problems that surface in working through the inter-
play between bright-line rules and a good faith exception, one crit-
ical point stands out. Any symbiosis between clear rules and good
faith is unlikely to relieve the current doctrinal pressure on the
fourth amendment. As long as a sphere of exclusion remains, the
area of evidentiary inadmissibility - bad faith - is likely to be
narrowly circumscribed. With the Supreme Court narrowly inter-
preting the fourth amendment to minimize the exclusion of evi-
dence from criminal trials,2 3 bright-line rules adopted by the Court
21. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, modified, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct.
2157 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), overruled, United States v. Ross,
102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), supra notes 55-100 and accompanying text.
22. See Ashdown, supra note 9; Bernardi, supra note 20.
23. See Burkoff, supra note 10, at 160, 186; Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary
Rule, 26 STA. L. Rav. 1027, 1038, 1047 (1974); McMillian, Is There Anything Left of the
Fourth Amendment?, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 3.4 (1979); Trager & Lobenfeld, The Law of
[Vol. 24:335
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probably will be drafted broadly in favor of law enforcement,
thereby reducing the incidence of findings of bad faith in which
the exclusionary rule would continue to operate.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN "BRIGHT-LINE" RULES AND
POLICE "GOOD FAITH"
A. Defining Good Faith
The major, persistent drawback to the injection of any good
faith notion into fourth amendment law has been the lack of ad-
ministerability. Whether the good faith determination is based on
a subjective standard, an objective test, or both, significant
problems exist for trial and appellate courts viewing a given set of
facts retrospectively. At the very least, the good faith approach will
force courts to undertake a burdensome case-by-case analysis, 4
with only a minimal probability of accuracy from case to case, and
nothing to show for the process except the increased availability of
evidence for introduction into criminal trials. This expansion of
admissible evidence is achieved without any clear points of demar-
cation between good and bad faith, thus creating a serious idiosyn-
crasy for a system based on the deterrence of unlawful invasion of
privacy. 5
It makes little difference whether the focus is on the subjective
state of mind of the officer or on the objective reasonableness of
his conduct. These standards, ultimately, are virtually identical.
Anyone familiar with the determination of subjective mental states
in the criminal law recognizes the impossibility of determining pre-
cisely an individual's state of mind on a particular occasion unless
the individual specifically discloses what he was thinking at the
time he acted. Whether made by a criminal defendant or by a law
enforcement officer, such a candid disclosure is unlikely. Moreover,
Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 41 BRooKLYN L. REV. 421, 453 (1975).
24. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 560-61 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
LaFave, supra note 13, at 355-57.
25. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 431. The authors argue that, in ruling
on suppression motions, the good faith approach will cause courts to focus on the reasona-
bleness of a police officer's conduct in light of the facts and the law without making clear
determinations of whether the fourth amendment was violated. Such a finding of good faith
irrespective of a fourth amendment violation will have little educational and deterrent im-
pact for future cases.
1983] 343
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evidence of such a disclosure is more likely to be available in the
case of the criminal defendant, whose accomplice may have an in-
centive to protect himself at his codefendant's expense, than in the
case of a police officer, whose fellow officers will operate from a
perspective of mutual protection.
In any event, direct evidence of a subjective state of mind gener-
ally will be unavailable, and thus the officer's mental state must be
discovered in some other way. The method utilized is one of deter-
mining what a reasonable person under the facts and circum-
stances would have thought or intended.2 6 Admittedly, the stan-
dard is still subjective, and consequently, the actor is entitled to
testify about his mental processes, including whether he acted in
good faith. Such testimony, however, is likely to be self-serving and
unreliable; therefore, additional considerations become relevant. It
is in this regard that a reasonableness criterion is utilized to deter-
mine what the circumstances and the person's conduct indicate
about his mental state in light of what is generally known about
human behavior. Consequently, any discussion about subjective
versus objective standards in regard to police good faith is largely
pedantic, unless of course, a policeman happened to have particu-
lar subjective characteristics such as mental retardation or a physi-
cal handicap which would be taken into account under a subjective
approach. The presence of such characteristics, however, is an in-
herent impossibility because, unlike criminal defendants, police of-
ficers do not possess such idiosyncracies; otherwise, they never
would have qualified for law enforcement in the first place. Thus,
any concern for the inability of judges to determine an officer's
subjective state of mind 7 is largely superfluous because of infer-
ences which can be made from circumstantial evidence.
Regardless of the virtual merger of the subjective and objective
views of good faith, most advocates of the good faith limitation
favor the objective, reasonable person standard because of per-
26. See, e.g., State v. Beale, 299 A.2d 921, 925 (Me. 1973), in which the court held that
"knowledge" of stolen property must be determined on the basis of what the defendant
subjectively knew, but that the jury, in reaching its decision, was allowed to consider what a
man of ordinary, average intelligence, or the reasonable person, would have concluded.
27. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 553, 560-61 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); LaFave, supra note 13, at 355-56.
[Vol. 24:335
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ceived advantages in administerability.28 The United States Su-
preme Court already appears to have adopted the objective ap-
proach in judging the conduct of law enforcement personnel.2 9
A test for determining good faith based on reasonableness, how-
ever, is unlikely to prove any more workable than subjective deter-
minations. To the extent that an officer relies on a statute later
declared unconstitutional 0 or on a case which is subsequently
overruled,31 good faith is generally apparent. In the vast majority
of cases in which good faith is alleged, however, the issue will be
whether the officer made a reasonable mistake as to the operative
facts or with respect to his legal authority.32 This issue is not easily
resolved. This then is the inherent problem with the utilization of
a good faith notion in fourth amendment litigation, and it is here
that the concept of drafting clear, easily applicable, bright-line
rules becomes relevant.
B. Bright-Line Rules
Bright-line rules describe a routine practice or standardized pro-
cedure with precise boundaries that is applicable to situations of a
given type regardless of variations in the facts of particular cases. 33
28. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); United States v.
Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981); ATTORNEY
GENSRAL's TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRME, FINAL REPORT 55 (1981). For whatever its inde-
pendent worth, all of these proposals for a good faith exception apparently contain a subjec-
tive criterion as well.
29. See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982) (indicating that the determi-
nation of probable cause is to be based on objective facts and not the subjective good faith
of police officers); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (adopting a reasonableness
approach to defining interrogation under Miranda); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128
(1978) (upholding a wiretap under an objective analysis of the federal agents' conduct even
though the agents admitted that they made no effort to comply with the "minimization"
requirement of Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976)). But see Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 70, 75-
83 (1982) (arguing that the Supreme Court has not forsaken all subjective motivations).
30. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
31. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
32. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538-39 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White
also recognized the technical type of fourth amendment violation in which the law changes
or a statute is declared unconstitutional.
33. See E. GRIsWOLD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME COURT 47 (1975);
LaFave, supra note 13, at 322-23 (quoting Wilkey, J., dissenting in United States v. Robin-
son, 471 F.2d 1082, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).
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The function of such rules is to remove the uncertainty from
fourth amendment law for the police and the courts. Rather than
leaving permissible search and seizure practices dependent on
case-by-case evaluation of the justification for the procedure em-
ployed, hard-and-fast rules are designed to make the fourth
amendment clear and consistent for those who apply it. Currently,
the primary champion of such an approach to interpreting the
fourth amendment is Professor LaFave, who "believe[s] that it is
extremely important that fourth amendment doctrine be expressed
in terms understandable to the police, to whom, after all, it is di-
rected." 4 The United States Supreme Court now has clearly pick-
ed up this theme and, in fact, recently cited Professor LaFave for a
statement of the proposition.35
The first case in which the Court clearly applied this approach
in the fourth amendment context was United States v. Robinson.36
In Robinson, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia had invalidated a search following the arrest of the de-
fendant for driving after revocation of his operator's license. The
court held that the legality of such a search depended on the
probability in a given case that the suspect was armed or conceal-
ing evidence.3 7 The United States Supreme Court, however, re-
jected this case-by-case approach. Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion concluded that:
A police officer's determination as to how and where to search
the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a
quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not
require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of
each step in the search. The authority to search the person inci-
dent to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to
disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a
court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest
situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon
the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based
on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
34. LaFave, supra note 13, at 333.
35. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting LaFave, supra note 6, at
141-42).
36. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
37. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to
the arrest requires no additional justification."8
The Supreme Court similarly refused to adopt a fluctuating
standard in Dunaway v. New York39 in which the defendant was
taken into custody for questioning although he was not formally
arrested or booked. The State contended that a balancing test
should be utilized which would permit a custodial detention for
investigation on something less than probable cause but something
more than the suspicion involved in a Terry-type stop.40 The Su-
preme Court rejected this view, because a "single, familiar stan-
dard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited
time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individ-
ual interests involved in the specific circumstances they con-
front." ' The Court held that any detention or custodial interroga-
tion required probable cause for its justification.42 Again, the Court
had steered away from a flexible approach which would have re-
quired contemporaneous factual evaluations by the police and ret-
rospective ad hoc determinations by the courts.
Prior to Dunaway, a majority of the Court likewise had avoided
such a result in Pennsylvania V. Mimms. 43 In Mimms, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court had reversed the respondent's conviction,
holding that his revolver had been seized in violation of the fourth
amendment because following a minor traffic arrest he was illegally
ordered to get out of his vehicle.' 4 This conclusion was based on
the fact that the officer "could point to no objective observable
facts to support a suspicion that criminal activity was afoot or that
the occupants of the vehicle posed a threat to police safety.""'
Again, the United States Supreme Court disagreed with this ap-
proach. Although mentioning nothing about bright-line rules, the
majority applied a balancing process to support the adoption of a
38. 414 U.S. at 235.
39. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
40. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
41. 442 U.S. at 213-14.
42. Id. at 216.
43. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
44. Commonwealth v. Mimms, 471 Pa. 546, 370 A.2d 1157, rev'd per curiam, 434 U.S. 106
(1977).
45. 471 Pa. at 551, 370 A.2d at 1160.
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clear and precise rule for the police to follow: a motorist could le-
gitimately be ordered out of a vehicle following a traffic arrest.46
In addition to providing clear instructions to the police, Mimms
highlights a justification for the adoption of rigid rules. In Mimms,
the Court concluded that the interest in the safety of the police
officer 47 outweighed the minor intrusion on the driver's personal
liberty when he was ordered to get out of the car following a traffic
stop. This analysis suggests that a universal rule was adopted not
only to guide police officers, but also because the facts of this par-
ticular kind of case - a traffic stop - would always justify a po-
lice officer asking the motorist to get out of his vehicle.
Thus, a related basis for a hard-and-fast rule exists anytime
case-by-case adjudication would consistently produce the same re-
sult.4 8 The best example of such a case is Michigan v. Summers,49
in which the defendant was detained at the scene of the execution
of a search warrant and then was arrested following the discovery
of contraband in the basement of his home. Heroin was found in
his coat pocket in a search incident to his arrest. In a prosecution
for possession of the heroin found on his person, the trial judge
suppressed the evidence on the ground of an illegal detention.
Both the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme
Court affirmed this ruling.
On certiorari, a majority of the United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that it was permissible, for fourth amendment
purposes, to detain persons found at the scene of the execution of
a warrant to search for contraband.50 Although suggesting that the
detention involved in Summers was of reduced intrusiveness,51 the
46. 434 U.S. at 110-11.
47. The two risks confronting an officer following a traffic stop, which were mentioned by
the per curiam opinion, are the threat of armed assault and accidental injury from passing
traffic. Id.
48. Professor LaFave suggests that this is one of four questions which should be explored
before any bright-line rule is adopted. See LaFave, supra note 13, at 325-26. LaFave asks
"whether the rule will produce results that at least approximate those which could be ob-
tained if a more careful case-by-case application of a principle were feasible." Id. at 328. He
does not argue, however, that this is a prerequisite to the adoption of a straightforward,
monolithic rule.
49. 462 U.S. 692 (1981).
50. Id. at 705.
51. Id. at 701-02.
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majority's conclusion was based primarily on an analysis of the
facts generally present when a search warrant for contraband is
executed. Justice Stevens' majority opinion mentioned four factors
that justified the detention of persons found at the scene of the
execution of a search warrant: (1) preventing flight of the suspects;
(2) minimizing the risk of harm to the officers; (3) providing assis-
tance to the officers by the occupants of the premises; and (4) the
existence of suspicion for the detention based on the regular issu-
ance of the search warrant supported by probable cause.52 The
Court in Michigan v. Summers thus adopted a bright-line rule as a
short-hand for case-by-case analysis when the presence of univer-
sal factors always would lead to the same result.
The latest series of cases in the Supreme Court's rule-oriented
approach to fourth amendment adjudication involves automobile
searches. This is an area that had plagued the courts for years, not
so much because of the relevant rules, but because of the unper-
suasiveness of their theory53 and the uncertainty of their applica-
tion." These problems undoubtedly explain the Supreme Court's
recent struggle in this area to develop straightforward rules to
guide the police and the courts.
Two decisions announced on the same day at the end of the 1980
Term led the way. In New York v. Belton,5 5 a majority of the
Court endeavored to delimit clearly the scope of a search incident
to a vehicular arrest. Although Chimel v. California"5 established
52. Id. at 702-03.
53. The Supreme Court has relied on two separate theories to justify granting the police
greater freedom to search automobiles: mobility of the vehicle, see Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), and a diminished expecta-
tion of privacy, see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976). The mobility notion is not applicable where the police have taken the vehi-
cle into custody or otherwise have immobilized it prior to the search. Additionally, not ev-
eryone would agree that the public expects less privacy in their automobile trunk than they
do in their home or office.
54. Historically, the area within the immediate control of the vehicular arrestee justifying
a search incident to the arrest has been less than clear. The Supreme Court attempted to
eliminate this confusion in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). See infra text accom-
panying notes 55-60. The permissible scope of a vehicular search based on probable cause is
also uncertain. The court dealt with this problem in the recent case of United States v.
Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 68-83.
55. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
56. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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the permissible bounds of a search incident to an arrest as includ-
ing the "arrestee's person and the area within his immediate con-
trol, '5 7 the application of the latter part of this rule always proved
troublesome in cases in which the defendant was arrested in an
automobile.58 Consequently, after citing Professor LaFave's call for
clear rules readily applicable by the police59 and stressing the need
for a familiar, workable rule in this *area, the Court held that fol-
lowing a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile,
the policeman may search the entire passenger compartment of the
vehicle, including any containers found therein.60
The second relevant case, Robbins v. California,"1 was factually
similar to Belton except that no arrest preceded the search. After
the petitioner was stopped for a traffic violation, an officer smelled
marijuana smoke. A vial of liquid was then discovered in a frisk of
the petitioner, and small amounts of marijuana were found in the
passenger compartment of petitioner's car. Two packages wrapped
in green opaque plastic subsequently were uncovered in a recessed
luggage compartment of the station wagon. Each package was un-
wrapped by the police and found to contain fifteen pounds of ma-
rijuana. Thus, the Court was faced with deciding the extent of the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement in light of
United States v. Chadwick6 2 and Arkansas v. Sanders,6 s which
had refused to extend a warrantless automobile search to luggage
found in the vehicle. In those cases, the Court held that a warrant
was required to validly search luggage found in a vehicle because a
greater privacy expectation applied to the luggage than to the
vehicle."
In Robbins, the Court had to determine the reach of Chadwick
and Sanders with respect to the packages containing marijuana. In
an effort to establish a bright-line rule6 5 of general applicability,
57. Id. at 763.
58. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459.(1981), and cases cited therein.
59. Id. at 458 (citing LaFave, supra note 6, at 141-42).
60. Id. at 460.
61. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
62. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
63. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
64. Chadwick involved a footlocker and Sanders involved an unlocked suitcase.
65. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 429 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 443 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 24:335
GOOD FAITH AND THE EXCLUSIONARY REMEDY
Justice Stewart, in a plurality opinion joined by Justices Brennan,
White, and Marshall, concluded that a closed, opaque container
could not be searched without a warrant despite the fact that the
container was found during the lawful warrantless search of an
automobile."
Dissatisfied with the resolution of the problem in Robbins and
its interplay with the Belton rule, 7 the Court granted certiorari in
yet another automobile search case, United States v. Ross,e8 with
instructions that the parties should reargue the issue presented in
Robbins. Ross involved a narcotics prosecution based on the
seizure of heroin from a brown paper bag found in the trunk of the
defendant's automobile. Also seized and introduced into evidence
at trial was $3,200 in cash discovered in the trunk in a zippered red
leather pouch. Although the police had probable cause to search
the car based on an informant's tip, 9 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, sitting en banc, ruled that no
distinction of constitutional significance existed between the two
containers and that they could not be searched validly without a
warrant. o
Thus, the issue facing the Court in Ross was the legality of the
warrantless search of the paper bag and leather pouch found in the
vehicle's trunk.7 1 Although the Court could have addressed the is-
sue of whether a legitimate expectation of privacy attached to the
66. Id. at 428.
67. According to Belton, closed containers found in the passenger compartment of the
vehicle can be searched incident to an arrest of an occupant of the vehicle. See supra text
accompanying notes 55-60. Thus, an officer could avoid the Robbins rule with respect to
containers in the passenger compartment by claiming that he made a preceding arrest. This
argument could have been advanced in Robbins. See 453 U.S. at 422-23.
68. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
69. The informant, who previously had proved to be reliable, stated that he had observed
the respondent selling narcotics and that respondent had told him additional narcotics were
in the trunk of his car. Id. at 2160.
70. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1170-71 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2157
(1982). A three-judge panel of the court of appeals previously had applied a privacy analysis
in concluding that the warrantless search of the paper bag was valid but the search of the
leather pouch was not. 102 S. Ct. at 2161.
71. Although Ross was arrested after the discovery of a pistol in the glove compartment
and prior to the search of the trunk, the search incident to arrest rule of New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), would not validate the search of the items found in the trunk,
because the Belton rule permits only the search of containers found in the passenger com-
partment of the vehicle.
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individual containers (or in the language of Robbins, whether they
required warrants because they constituted "closed, opaque con-
tainers"), 2 a majority instead chose to reconsider the issue dealt
with in the plurality opinion in Robbins - the constitutional per-
missibility of opening a closed container found in an automobile in
the course of a valid warrantless search of the vehicle based on
probable cause.
In resolving this question, Justice Stevens' majority opinion ini-
tially distinguished Chadwick and Sanders by noting that proba-
ble cause existed in those cases to search only the luggage in ques-
tion and not the entire vehicle. 3 Stevens then noted that Carroll v.
United States,7 4 the source of the automobile exception, permitted
considerably more than a plain view search of the vehicle, 7  and
that two of that Court's cases, 7 6 as well as lower court cases,7 7 had
upheld the warrantless search of containers found during a lavful
search of an automobile. The majority opinion concluded that the
same impracticability that justifies the warrantless search of a ve-
hicle also applies to containers found inside.7 s Noting that a lawful
search of fixed premises extends to confines and containers where
the object of the search might be located,7 9 the Court held that the
permissible scope of the warrantless search of a vehicle is as broad
as that which a magistrate could authorize with a warrant.s "If
probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it
justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents
72. The majority expressly refused to draw a distinction between "worthy" and "unwor-
thy" containers. 102 S. Ct. at 2171.
73. Id. at 2167. Justice Stevens' distinction of Chadwick and Sanders was taken from the
Chief Justice's concurring opinion in Sanders, and the opinions of Justices Powell and Ste-
vens, concurring and dissenting respectively, in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 429-36,
445-53 (1981). Although Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Ross distinguished Sanders, he
noted that the language of Sanders was considerably broader than the basis of his distinc-
tion. 102 S. Ct. at 2167 n.19.
74. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
75. 102 S. Ct. at 2169.
76. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694
(1931).
77. See 102 S. Ct. at 2170 n.25 (citing lower court cases).
78. Id. at 2170.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2172.
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that may conceal the object of the search.""1
Although the majority opinion in Ross did not state specifically
that its objective was the establishment of a bright-line rule in the
case of automobile searches, the opinion did speak of the need for
clarification in this area.82 Justices Blackmun and Powell, in sepa-
rate concurring opinions, also specifically mentioned the need for a
clearly established legal rule to guide law enforcement officials. 3
An analysis of the majority opinion in Ross leads to the conclu-
sion that one of the primary goals of the Court was the establish-
ment of a precise, straightforward standard in this troubled area.
The first notable feature of Justice Stevens' opinion is that he vir-
tually ignores the privacy analysis which the Court had developed
for measuring the necessity of a search warrant.8 4 In particular, he
fails to adequately deal with the Court's former conclusion that a
legitimate expectation of privacy attaches to closed containers and
that therefore a warrant must be obtained to search them. 5
Instead, the opinion returned to the mobility notion for justify-
ing the warrantless search of an automobile and its contents.8 6
This is especially interesting because the Court had shifted to a
privacy analysis as the basis of the automobile exception8 7 due, in
part, to the inadequacy of the mobility argument. An automobile,
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2161-62.
83. Id. at 2173.
84. See Ashdown, supra note 9.
85. Although Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Ross distinguishes Chadwick and Sand-
ers by arguing that in those cases probable cause existed only to search the luggage in ques-
tion and not to search the entire vehicle, see supra note 73, the opinion fails to explain
satisfactorily why an individual's expectation of privacy in a closed container is altered
when the container is placed in a vehicle. In his only reference to privacy, Justice Stevens
states that "an individual's expectation of privacy in a vehicle and its contents may not
survive if probable cause is given to believe that the vehicle is transporting contraband." 102
S. Ct. at 2171. This statement, however, is more conclusive than explanatory, because it
lumps together vehicles and closed containers, items which the Court formerly had treated
differently. Additionally, this statement fails to explain why the privacy expectation in a
container is generally protected by the warrant requirement, but is sacrified when the article
is placed in a vehicle.
86. 102 S. Ct. at 2162, 2171.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977); United States v. Marti-
nez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68
(1976); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591-92 (1974);
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973).
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once stopped and subjected to police control, is no longer mobile.8
Justice Stevens attempts to counter this fact arguing by reference
to Chambers v. Maroney"9 that, for constitutional purposes, no dif-
ference exists between the warrantless seizure of a car and its war-
rantless search, and that if an immediate search on the street is
permissible, a subsequent warrantless search at the station also is
valid."
Although these conclusions are based largely on the impractica-
bility of seizing a vehicle while the probable cause issue is
presented to a magistrate, this reasoning does not satisfactorily
deal with the difference between seizing and holding an automobile
and seizing a container found inside it while a warrant is sought."'
A movable container can easily be taken into physical possession
and brought to the magistrate.2 This reliance on the mobility the-
ory as justification for a warrantless search appears problematic
when it is extended to closed containers, which readily can be
taken into police custody with only minimal inconvenience to the
owner. As explained by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Ross, it is
not probable cause alone that justifies a warrantless search of an
automobile, but probable cause plus mobility.9 3
Although the Supreme Court in Ross purported not to overrule
Chadwick and Sanders, the cases are difficult to distinguish ana-
lytically. For example, a piece of luggage that police have probable
cause to search located outside a vehicle is just as mobile or immo-
bile as the same luggage found inside an automobile, 4 and the
88. Once the occupants have been removed from a vehicle, the only real interruption in
complete police dominion of the automobile (and the possible loss of evidence) occurs when
the vehicle is towed to the police garage by a private towing company. The potential for the
loss or destruction of evidence in these circumstances, however, is minimal.
89. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
90. 102 S. Ct. at 2163 n.9.
91. Id. at 2174 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 2176 (Marshall J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. The mobility notion is the precise argument that the Supreme Court rejected in
United States v. Chadwick, 443 U.S. 1 (1977). In Chadwick, the Chief Justice's majority
opinion concluded:
Nor does the footlockers mobility justify dispensing with the added protec-
tion of the Warrant Clause. Once the federal agents had seized it ... and had
safely transferred it to the ... Federal Building under their exclusive control,
there was not the slightest danger that the footlocker or its contents could
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same kind of privacy expectation should apply in either case.95
The Court's ultimate resolution of the issue presented in Rob-
bins and Ross - the permissibility of opening containers found in
a vehicle during a warrantless auto search - suggests the concomi-
tant goals of expediency 6 and clarification.9 7 Justice Stevens' ma-
jority opinion states: "When a legitimate search is underway,.
nice distinctions . . . must give way to the interest in the prompt
and efficient completion of the task at hand."9 8 Permitting the im-
mediate search of containers found inside a vehicle being searched
on the basis of probable cause clearly expedites crime detection
because it eliminates the time and trouble of seeking a warrant
from a magistrate, thus "ensuring that the private containers into
which criminal suspects often place goods no longer will be a
Fourth Amendment shield."9 9
In addition to streamlining auto searches, Justice Stevens' lan-
guage and analysis indicate that a majority of the Court in Ross
was following the recent pattern of fourth, amendment adjudication
which establishes rules providing specific guidance to law enforce-
ment officers. As stated by Justice Powell in his concurrence in
Ross, "in enunciating a readily understood and applied rule, to-
day's decision is consistent with the similar step taken last Term
in New York v. Belton."1 0
have been removed before a valid search warrant could be obtained.
Id. at 13. In an accompanying footnote, Chief Justice Burger distinguished automobiles in
the following way:
This may often not be the case when automobiles are seized. Absolutely se-
cure storage facilities may not be available .... and the size and inherent
mobility of a vehicle make it susceptible to theft or intrusion by vandals.
Id. at 13 n.7 (citations omitted).
95. The Court relied on the relative expectations of privacy in luggage and automobiles to
distinguish Chadwick and Sanders. Nevertheless, the majority in Ross offered a disavowal
of this analysis by stating, without explanation, that "an individual's expectation of privacy
in a vehicle and its contents may not survive if probable cause is given to believe that the
vehicle is transporting contraband." 102 S. Ct. at 2171 (emphasis added).
96. See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2181 (1981) (Marshall, J., joined by Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 82 & 83.
98. 102 S. Ct. at 2170-71.
99. Id. at 2181 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2173 (Powell, J., concurring).
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C. Bright Lines and Good Faith
United States v. Ross is the latest in a series of cases that
exhibit a rule-oriented method of fourth amendment adjudication.
Such an approach to the resolution of fourth amendment issues
not only provides clear guidance to the police, it also provides the
structure needed to implement the proposed good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule. Under a precisely formulated standard,
the police should know exactly what investigatory and detection
practices they are permitted to employ in particular situations. If
the actions of law enforcement officers are permitted by a bright-
line rule, .under an objective approach, no constitutional violation
occurred and good faith is irrelevant. Conversely, if a clear, easily
applied standard is violated, bad faith can be presumed.101
A few examples, one actual and the other hypothetical, ade-
quately illustrate the operation of this good faith/bad faith dichot-
omy. In Dunaway v. New York, 02 the Supreme Court rejected the
state's argument that a balancing test of reasonableness should ap-
ply to all seizures that do not constitute technical arrests. The
Court held instead that a single, familiar standard of probable
cause was necessary to support detention for custodial interroga-
tion. 103 Consequently, in the recently decided case of Taylor v. Al-
abama,0 1 the Supreme Court reversed the petitioner's conviction
where a confession was obtained six hours after he was picked up
for questioning based on an informant's tip that failed to establish
probable cause. °10 Most importantly, the Court refused to consider
the state's argument that the conduct of the police was in good
faith where the investigatory arrest without probable cause vio-
101. In fact, it can be argued that a pervasive set of bright-line rules virtually eliminates
the need to consider the good faith/bad faith dichotomy. See LaFave, supra note 13. With a
system of clear standards guiding and governing the police, any violation would lead to the
exclusion of evidence. This of course assumes that a rule violation would be dispositive with
no room to argue exigent circumstances or mistake of fact.
102. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). For a discussion of Dunaway, see supra text accompanying
notes 39-42.
103. 442 U.S. at 213.
104. 102 S. Ct. 2664 (1982).
105. The informant had never before provided similar information to the officer involved,
he did not indicate how he acquired his information on this occasion, and he did not provide
any details of the crime in question. Id. at 2667.
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lated the clear rule of Dunaway.'8
The interplay between Ross and Chadwick represents another
situation in which the message to law enforcement officials, if not
the logic of the rules, 107 is clear. If the police discover a closed
container, for example a suitcase, in an automobile that they have
probable cause to search, they can search the luggage without a
warrant; however, if the same suitcase is found in a home or at the
airport, a warrant is required even though probable cause to search
exists.10 8 If officers were to search in the latter case without first
obtaining a warrant, any evidence obtained would be subject to ex-
clusion even under a good faith exception because it could be con-
cluded that they acted in bad faith due to violation of the explicit
rule of Chadwick. Although a finding of bad faith in such a case
need not be automatic, a bright-line rule violation would at least
establish a rebuttable presumption of dereliction, and a strong
showing of facts supporting a reasonable belief in an exigency
would be necessary to overcome this presumption.
In areas where the Supreme Court has been able to formulate
bright-line rules, a bad faith approach to the exclusion of evidence
appears to be at least superficially workable. Nevertheless, even
though a series of easily understood and applied standards may
alleviate the administrative burden of the good faith notion, such a
system creates its own problems of administerability. Of greater
significance, this method of adjudication fails to eliminate a deeper
tension in the criminal process - the restriction in the substantive
reach of the fourth amendment. It is to these problems that this
Article will now turn.
106. Id. at 2669. Of course, the Court has not yet adopted a good faith exception to the
exclusion of evidence. If, however, a majority of the Court were so inclined, Taylor v. Ala-
bama would have been a poor case in which to adopt this rule because Taylor involved a
violation of a clear Court precedent. See supra note 8.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 95-100.
108. This assumes that a warrantless search would not be supportable as incident to an
arrest. See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
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III. ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES
A. Developing Bright Lines
As previously discussed,109 the possibility of a working relation-
ship exists between bright-line rules and the operation of the pro-
posed good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. For this alli-
ance to be effective, however, a fairly pervasive set of unequivocal
rules must exist. At present, only a handful of cases provide the
criminal process, or more particularly, the law of search and
seizure, with such clear standards. 110 Therefore, two options are
available: either the adoption of a good faith standard can await
the development of a complete body of bright-line rules, a process
that will take considerable time given the lethargic movement of
cases through the criminal justice system, or a good faith exception
can be presently adopted, with its operation to be augmented by
rule-oriented decisions as they become available. Given the im-
practicality of the former choice, the development of a system in
which the good faith determination is geared to categorical rules
would most likely have to follow the latter pattern.' It is with
respect to this kind of a scheme that new administrative problems
begin to emerge.
Such a system obviously is dependent on the continued formula-
tion of bright-line rules to facilitate the good faith/bad faith deter-
mination. There is some reason to believe, however, that once a
good faith notion is accepted into fourth amendment law, develop-
ment of the needed categorical rules will be impeded. Impediments
will occur for several reasons. First, the use of a good faith notion
in search and seizure adjudication may limit the number of fourth
amendment claims, thereby reducing the opportunities for courts
to fashion explicit rules. When the police have complied with a
statute or court decision, defendants will have little incentive to
challenge the statute or seek modification of the decision because
law enforcement compliance with the law in existence at the time
of their conduct conclusively establishes good faith under an objec-
109. See supra text accompanying notes 101-08.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 35-100.
111. Another option for future fourth amendment adjudication would be to focus on the
development of clear standards to guide the police and the courts without adopting a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See LaFave, supra note 13.
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tive standard.112 Criminal defendants, who by nature are self-serv-
ing, and defense attorneys, who operate under time constraints,
will have little interest in seeking an alteration of the law exclu-
sively for future cases. 1 '
In addition, even in cases in which the police have failed to com-
ply with existing law, liberalization of permissible law enforcement
behavior under the good faith rationale will reduce the incentive to
challenge the conduct in question.114 Given the relative ease with
which good faith can be established in cases in which the police
conduct is not egregious,115 defendants and their attorneys may
prefer to devote their energy to other aspects of the case.
This leads to the major point to be made with respect to the
difficulty in establishing bright-line rules in the context of a good
faith exception to the suppression of evidence. With good faith as
the focal point of a decision, courts are unlikely either to decide
the actual constitutional questions presented or to engage in the
promulgation of precise standards to govern law enforcement of-
ficers in future similar cases. Under the good faith formula, the
judicial inquiry is likely to be centered on the reasonableness of
the police behavior under the circumstances rather than on the
dual inquiry of whether the fourth amendment was actually vio-
lated and the need for a clear rule in cases such as the one under
consideration.11
Two cases that have utilized the good faith notion highlight the
112. When law enforcement officers have complied with an existing statute or court deci-
sion that is subsequently invalidated or modified, their conduct falls within the so-called
"technical violations" branch of the good faith exception. See United States v. Williams, 622
F.2d 830, 840-41 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) (citing Ball, supra note
12, at 635-36); Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 424-31. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 538-42 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). Although Justice White does not specifically
refer to technical violations, he speaks of situations where an officer acts in reasonable reli-
ance on a court decision that may later be modified or on a statute that subsequently is
declared unconstitutional. Id.
113. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 451-52.
114. When the conduct of the police fails to conform to an existing court decision, good
faith may be claimed on the basis of a reasonable mistake of fact. This falls within the
"good faith mistake" branch of the good faith rule. See supra note 112.
115. See Ball, supra note 12, at 655-56; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 452.
116. Justice Brennan probably was the first to express this fear when he stated in his
dissenting opinion in United States v. Peltier, 442 U.S. 531 (1971), that the good faith ex-
ception "could stop dead in its tracks judicial development of Fourth Amendment rights."
Id. at 554 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also LaFave, supra note 13, at 354-55.
1983]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
accuracy of this projection. In United States v. Williams,117 the
first case to work a wholesale adoption of the good faith exception,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in a sec-
ond majority opinion11 applied its new standard without first de-
termining whether the underlying conduct of the federal agent was
illegal. Williams was arrested by an agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration for jumping bail or, alternatively, for violating a
bond condition.' A search incident to this arrest produced nar-
cotics, which were the basis of the subsequent prosecution. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
and a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
the federal agent had no authority to arrest Williams in this situa-
tion and consequently that the search incident thereto was ille-
gal. 20 The Fifth Circuit, on its own motion, granted rehearing en
banc.' 21 In the second of two majority opinions, thirteen judges
considered it unnecessary to determine if the arrest was valid. In-
stead, they held that "evidence is not to be suppressed under the
exclusionary rule where it is discovered by officers in the course of
actions that are taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though
mistaken, belief that they are authorized. ' 122 In suggesting that the
agent may have violated the fourth amendment, but not deciding
this question because the agent acted reasonably and in good faith,
the second majority provided no insight as to the power of law en-
forcement officers to arrest for jumping bail and violating bail con-
ditions. This type of adjudication not only fails to provide clear
rules in the fourth amendment field, it also undermines the educa-
tional and deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule itself.1 23
117. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
118. After 16 judges joined in an opinion upholding the drug enforcement agent's arrest
of Williams and, consequently, the incident search that produced narcotics, 622 F.2d at 833-
39, 13 judges joined in a separate majority adopting and applying a good faith exception to
the exclusion of evidence. Id. at 840-47.
119. The condition placed on the order releasing Williams on bond was that she not
travel outside of Ohio. Id. at 833. She was arrested in the Atlanta International Airport. Id.
at 834.
120. Id. at 835.
121. 594 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1979).
122. 622 F.2d at 840.
123. Although, when viewed retrospectively, the conduct of an officer who acts in good
faith is not deterrable, this limited view of deterrence ignores the educational effect and the
impact on police behavior that the clear resolution of a constitutional issue can have. See
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Similarly, in Richmond v. Commonwealth,124 a recent decision of
the Kentucky Court of Appeals utilizing a good faith analysis
where officers acted under the authority of a warrant, the court
refused to decide the constitutional issue. The defendant had chal-
lenged the warrant because it was issued by a district judge outside
the territorial limits of his district. The court stated:
We doubt the authority of a district judge, while outside the ter-
ritorial limits of his district, to issue a warrant for the search of
premises outside his district.... 125 We find it unnecessary
[,however,] to decide that particular issue . . . because we be-
lieve the fruits of the search should not have been suppressed
even though the magistrate may not have had authority to issue
[the warrant].126
This reasoning was based on the conclusion that the officer had
acted reasonably and in good faith.127 Because the court used the
good faith rationale employed in Williams, it failed to answer the
relevant constitutional question - whether the judge had author-
ity to issue a warrant outside of his territorial jurisdiction.
Williams and Richmond exemplify the potential for the good
faith rule to turn fourth amendment adjudication into an inquiry
based solely on reasonableness. 28 Under this analysis, not only will
courts be able to avoid settling fourth amendment issues and for-
mulating bright-line rules, but well-established fourth amendment
concepts such as "probable cause," "articulable suspicion," and
"exigent circumstances" are likely to be diluted. 2 9 The ultimate
paradox is that instead of encouraging the development of une-
quivocal standards to guide the police and to operate as ready
benchmarks for the bad faith determination, the good faith analy-
sis actually will cause courts to gravitate away from rule-oriented
Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 431.
124. No. 80-CA-1366-MR (Ky. Ct. App., July 31, 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 637
S.W.2d 642 (Ky. 1982).
125. Id., slip op. at 4.
126. Id.
127. Id., slip op. at 9.
128. See Ball, supra note 12, at 655-56; Bernardi, supra note 20, at 104; Mertens & Was-
serstrom, supra note 14, at 428.
129. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 528.
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adjudication.13 This phenomenon, coupled with the fact that some
fourth amendment concepts, such as probable cause, are not reduc-
ible to easily quantifiable and readily applicable rules, will leave a
significant portion of fourth amendment law without the help of
bright-line rules to aid the good faith determination.
B. Exigent Circumstances and Mistakes of Fact
Even when precise procedural standards are available, adminis-
trative difficulties cannot be eliminated entirely. Unless a rule vio-
lation automatically amounts to bad faith, courts still will be faced
with the ad hoc resolution of factual issues which will emerge from
the government's attempt to rebut the presumption of bad faith
arising from the failure of the police to comply with a standardized
procedure. Bad faith, and the concomitant suppression of evidence,
cannot be unequivocally deduced, however, from the violation of
an explicit rule. Noncompliance may be based on some exigency or
on a reasonable mistake of fact. These circumstances, in which the
conduct of the police is in theory nondeterrable, represent the very
foundation on which the good faith notion is grounded. Therefore,
unless rules can be drafted in such a straightforward, hard-and-
fast fashion as to eliminate all exceptions, a task which seems vir-
tually impossible given the tremendous variety of police-suspect
encounters, courts still will be faced with the burden of making
difficult factual decisions when rules are violated.
For example, in cases in which the police have failed to comply
with the rule requiring an arrest warrant to enter private premises
to make an arrest,131 both trial and appellate judges still find
themselves adjudicating the factual question of whether exigent
130. This result could possibly be avoided if courts were to decide the fourth amendment
issue first, formulating clear rules when possible, before turning to the good faith question.
See Note, supra note 20, at 942. Courts generally are not inclined, however, to reach issues
they do not have to decide in order to resolve the case. As stated by Justice Brennan, "there
is clear precedent for avoiding decision of a constitutional issue raised by police behavior
when in any event the evidence [is] admissible in the particular case at bar." United States
v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 555 n.14 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Current examples are the
second majority opinion in United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981), and Richmond v. Commonwealth, No. 80-CA-1366-MR (Ky.
Ct. App., July 31, 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 637 S.W.2d 642 (Ky. 1982). See supra text
accompanying notes 117-27.
131. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
362 [Vol. 24:335
1983] GOOD FAITH AND THE EXCLUSIONARY REMEDY
circumstances justified the warrantless entry. In People v. Car-
mack,3 2 the Appellate Court of Illinois analyzed the facts in terms
of seven separate factors before concluding that exigent circum-
stances justified a warrantless arrest of the defendant in his home.
Even when the allegation of exigent circumstances has been re-
jected in this context, courts are forced to spend time analyzing
the claim. 133
Although the Supreme Court expressly excepted exigent circum-
stances from its arrest warrant rule,3 such an express recognition
is hardly necessary to trigger a good faith claim following violation
of a clear-cut rule. Assume, for instance, that the police violate the
Chadwick-Sanders-Ross principle'3 5 by searching, without a war-
rant, a suitcase found at an airport. Even though a warrant clearly
is required under such circumstances, 3 an immediate search of
the suitcase arguably may have been necessary to identify which of
several suspects owned the luggage and was therefore subject to
arrest. Although a court might reject this argument, for example,
because independent probable cause existed to arrest the defen-
dant, the court, nevertheless, would have to consider the facts and
the arguments of the parties before resolving the matter. The exi-
132. 103 IM. App. 3d 1027, 432 N.E.2d 282 (1982).
133. See, e.g., United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1144 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (dis-
cussing Dorman but also suggesting that exigent circumstances may depend on the availa-
bility of a telephone warrant); United States v. Minick, 438 A.2d 205 (1981), vacated and
rehearing en banc granted, Jan. 13, 1982 (applying multifactor test of Dorman); Spring v.
State, 626 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (unsupported home entry following arrest);
Provost v. State, 631 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (actions of police contradicted
their stated purpose for warrantless entry).
See also Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982), in which two state appellate courts,
and ultimately the United States Supreme Court, were required to analyze the operative
facts to determine if a warrantless room entry was proper. The Supreme Court held the
entry permissible because a lawful arrest already had taken place and the officer was thus
authorized to closely monitor the movements of the arrestee.
134. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
135. Together, these cases stand for the principle that a legitimate expectation of privacy
applies to a repository of personal effects or other closed containers, and consequently such
containers cannot be searched without a warrant if they are found outside a vehicle. United
States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); Chadwick v.
United States, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
136. This assumes either that no arrest has taken place or, if there has been an arrest,
that the suitcase could not be opened or searched incident thereto. But cf. text accompany-
ing notes 171-73.
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gent circumstances issue thus lurks in the background of bright-
line rules to prevent such rules from providing the desired admin-
istrative efficiency in a system of adjudication based on good faith.
The above-mentioned example also illustrates another problem
undermining the ready determination of bad faith based on non-
compliance with an explicit rule. When an officer acts on the basis
of an erroneous assessment of the operative facts, bright-line rules
simply do not alleviate the administrative burden of determining
good faith.137 In the above examples regarding residential arrests
and luggage searches, if the officers reasonably believed that exi-
gent circumstances existed, then they acted in good faith even
though mistaken. Thus, a court faced with this question cannot
rely on the violation of a bright-line rule, but must determine the
reasonableness of the alleged mistake of fact.
Most significant with respect to factual mistakes is the realiza-
tion that virtually every one of the Supreme Court's bright-line
rules involves the probable cause determination in some form.1 38
Despite compliance with the bright-line rule,3 9 the basic triggering
mechanism which activates the rule - probable cause - may be
challenged. A court then would have to determine whether proba-
ble cause existed and, if not, whether the alleged belief in its exis-
tence was reasonable, thereby establishing good faith.140
What this means, of course, is that the establishment of clear,
precise rules as to what the police can and cannot do in certain
situations will not solve the practical difficulties in determining
good faith. Although initially and superficially it might appear that
good faith can be equated with rule compliance and bad faith with
137. Justice White was the first to observe that police conduct based on a mistake of fact
cannot be deterred by the exclusionary rule. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540-42 (1976)
(White, J., dissenting).
138. Other than situations in which the fourth amendment does not apply because of the
absence of a privacy expectation, and Terry-type stops based on articulable suspicion, all
police investigatory practices require probable cause regardless of whether a warrant is also
required.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 36-100.
140. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538-40 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan has argued that the operation of the good faith rule in this context will reduce the
probable cause standard to one of reasonableness thereby undermining the deterrence ra-
tionale by encouraging the police to take chances. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531,
556-59 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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noncompliance, such a ready formula is too simplistic for a good
faith system based on the deterrence rationale. This represents an-
other of the pragmatic problems with a good faith/bright-line rule
partnership. The real problems, however, are jurisprudential rather
than administrative. It is to this concern that we will now turn.
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND BRIGHT-LINE RULES
A. The Difficulty of Illuminating the Law of Search and Seizure
Professor Wayne LaFave, one of our foremost fourth amend-
ment scholars and a longtime advocate of clear standards to guide
the police,141 has said in reference to bright-line rules that "the
'bright-line' needed . . . is one which irradiates, [and] not one
which bedazzles. ' 14 2 The problem, however, is an inherent inability
to achieve an adequate level of irradiation for the police to consist-
ently follow and for the courts to effectively utilize. Fourth amend-
ment encounters between the police and the public are simply too
numerous and too varied to be subject to standardized procedures
that will always dictate the appropriate police response. Because of
this variety and diversity, attempts to draft bright-line rules have
proved unsuccessful. Such rules provide some guidance but are in-
capable of addressing in advance all the factual situations that po-
lice may encounter. To the extent that bright-line rules bedazzle,
they will be of little help to the courts in dealing with the good
faith question.
United States v. Robinson,14 3 the Supreme Court's first holding
expressly eschewing case-by-case analysis of the justification for
the police practice employed in favor of a standard procedure
available to the police in all similar fourth amendment cases, ex-
emplifies the difficulties in drafting hard-and-fast rules. Although
Robinson instructs the police that they may engage in a full search
of the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, the decision says
nothing of when a custodial arrest is legitimate.14 4 An officer thus
141. See LaFave, supra note 13; LaFave, supra note 6.
142. LaFave, supra note 13, at 327.
143. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
144. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Stewart points out the relevance of the issue of whether taking someone into custody
following a minor traffic arrest is legitimate under the fourth amendment. Once the consti-
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is left with a case-by-case evaluation of whether to make a custo-
dial arrest and a subsequent personal search. The existence of such
discretion under the Robinson rule is subject to obvious abuse 45
and provides little aid in the good faith determination. 46
Another bright-line rule was established in Michigan v. Sum-
mers 47 in which the Supreme Court concluded that detention of
persons found at the scene of the execution of a search warrant
was constitutionally permissible. 48 This rule appears clear-cut and
operates to expedite law enforcement by facilitating a further
search and seizure of the person if incriminating items should be
uncovered in the execution of the warrant. The Summers rule,
however, creates more questions than it answers and fails to ad-
dress the major issue in this area. The facts of Summers specifi-
cally involved the occupant of a home for which a search warrant
had been issued. Although the language and analysis of Justice
Stevens' majority opinion suggests that the detention rule might
be limited to residents,14 9 whether the holding applies to nonresi-
dents or to places other than dwellings is uncertain. If Summers is
given an expansive reading, then the police and the courts are left
with the question of who can be arrested following the detention of
those found at the scene and the discovery of contraband on the
premises. Obviously occupant-residents can be arrested, but, other-
wise, what kind of property or business connection is necessary to
provide probable cause for arrest? The opinion does not say.
A further ambiguity created by the Supreme Court's detention
rule is the scope of the "scene" of the execution of the warrant.
Does the rule apply to persons in the yard or to people in
tutional validity of the arrest is established, the validity of the incidental search follows
therefrom. Stewart points out, however, that the validity of the arrest may be the subject of
an initial and persuasive challenge. Id.
145. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), provides an example of such abuse. Gus-
tafson was arrested for failure to have an operator's license in his possession.
146. The reasonableness and consequent good faith of the arresting officer in taking the
arrestee into custody still will be subject to case-by-case determination.
147. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
148. The Court's holding was based on a conclusion that the intrusion was minimal, valid
law enforcement objectives were involved, and the regular issuance of a search warrant pro-
vided sufficient articulable suspicion for the detention. 452 U.S. at 701-04.
149. Summers, in fact, was a resident of the home for which the warrant was issued, and
Justice Stevens' majority opinion at several places refers to "occupants." Id. at 702, 703,
705.
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automobiles parked in front of the premises? Can persons leaving
the scene when officers arrivei50 or coming after commencement of
the search be detained?
In addition to the ambiguities mentioned above, which suggest
something less than a bright-line rule,151 Summers is of absolutely
no aid in deciding the more difficult question of when persons
found at the scene, but not named in the warrant, may be
searched. 52 This is both the most important and most troublesome
issue facing the police and the courts in the area of search warrant
execution and currently must be decided on an ad hoc basis. Some
guidance with respect to this issue is needed in the form of a stan-
dardized procedure.15 3
Any discussion of the adequacy of the Court's bright-line rule
cases would be incomplete without consideration of the recent
Robbins-Belton-Ross automobile trilogy."" Robbins v. California55
and New York v. Belton 5 6 were decided on the same day at the
end of the Supreme Court's 1980 Term. Both cases dealt with the
search of closed items - a wrapped package and a zippered jacket
pocket - found in an automobile. The issue in these cases was
created by the Supreme Court's earlier decisions in United States
v. Chadwick57 and Arkansas v. Sanders'" which held that lug-
gage, to which a reasonable expectation of privacy attached, could
not be searched without a warrant even though found in an auto-
150. This question seems to be answered in Summers to the extent that persons are walk-
ing out the door or descending the "front steps" when officers arrive. Id. at 693. Summers
does not indicate, however, how far from the premises suspects can be and nevertheless still
be detained.
151. Arguably, a bright-line rule does exist if the decision is limited to its facts - the
detention of a resident who attempts to leave the scene upon the arrival of the police.
152. See 2 LAFAvE, SEARcH AND SEIZURE § 4.9(e) (1978). Of course, if someone found at
the scene of a search is arrested legitimately, then they can be searched incident to the
arrest. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
153. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (officers saw and smelled mari-
juana when attempting to serve arrest warrant at suspect's home; five other persons found
on the premises were detained until search warrant was obtained); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85 (1979) (search warrant for tavern and bartenders served while patrons present).
154. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
155. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
156. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
157. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
158. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
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mobile that was subject to a warrantless search. Because an inter-
vening arrest had taken place in Belton, the Court analyzed the
container search question differently in the two cases. In Belton, a
majority of the Justices concluded that the search of the zippered
jacket pocket was justifiable as a search incident to the preceding
arrest.""9 In Robbins, a plurality opinion, the Court held that a
warrantless, probable cause search of an automobile could not ex-
tend to the opening of "closed, opaque containers" found inside."' 0
In Robbins, the Supreme Court was faced directly with elucida-
tion of the holdings in Chadwick and Sanders. These latter cases
involved luggage, and Robbins involved the warrantless opening of
two packages wrapped in green, opaque plastic. The packages were
found in a recessed luggage compartment of the petitioner's station
wagon after he had been stopped for a traffic violation and the of-
ficers had detected the presence of marijuana in the vehicle. Mari-
juana was found in the packages after they were opened.
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Robbins attempted to crys-
tallize the Chadwick and Sanders decisions into a clear rule of
general application to guide the police in future auto search cases
in which containers were found inside the vehicle. The phrase cho-
sen by the plurality, however, was less than illuminating and again
exemplified the difficulty of drafting bright-line rules. The plural-
ity opinion concluded that "closed, opaque containers" found dur-
ing the lawful search of a vehicle may not be opened without a
warrant.16" ' Although the Court consistently had drawn distinctions
between automobiles and certain kinds of containers based on per-
ceived differences in privacy interests, there had not been a clear
point of demarcation as to which kinds of containers were entitled
to the greater protection of a search warrant. The Robbins plural-
ity attempted to draw this line with its "closed, opaque container"
rule.
As pointed out by Justice Powell's concurring opinion, however,
the plurality's attempt to establish a bright-line rule is far from
satisfying.1 6 2 Each one of the terms in the chosen phrase is some-
159. 453 U.s. at 460-61.
160. 453 U.S. at 426, 428-29.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 433-34 (Powell, J., concurring).
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what indefinite. What is a container and when is it closed and
opaque?163 Does the term apply to bottles, tins, cardboard boxes,
paper cups, laundry bags, and the "ubiquitous brown paper gro-
cery sack?' 6 4 The plurality also left unclear whether these ques-
tions were to be answered categorically or whether in each case a
court was to inquire into whether a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy attached to a particular container.'6 5 Thus, Robbins did little
to advance the -objective of formulating bright-line rules to guide
the police and the courts.
Equally troublesome is New York v. Belton,6 6 which was de-
cided the same day as Robbins. In Belton, a five-Justice majority'6 7
seized the fact that an arrest had occurred to justify the subse-
quent search of the zippered pocket of a jacket found in the back
seat of the automobile. In order to provide "[a] single familiar
standard . to guide police officers,"'6 8 the Court held that inci-
dent to the lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automo-
bile, the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle could be
searched, including any closed containers found therein.6 "
Although such a rule defining the permissible scope of a search
incident to a vehicular arrest seems clear, Justice Brennan's dis-
senting opinion plainly points out the ambiguity of the rule:
163. Justice Stewart used the word "opaque" in a rather confusing fashion, for he appar-
ently intended the term to refer to something that cannot be seen through, or is impenetra-
ble by light. Although this is the correct definition, the term "opaque" may be understood
colloquially to mean something which light does pass through and which vaguely can be
seen through.
164. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 429 n.1, 434 n.3 (1981) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). The Court ultimately dealt with the brown paper bag question in United States v.
Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
165. 453 U.S. at 434 n.3. This raises the "worthy" versus "unworthy" container issue that
was the basis of the court of appeals' panel decision in United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159,
1161 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2160-61 (1982).
166. 453 U.S. 454 (1982).
167. Interestingly, Belton involved the fortuity of an intervening arrest based on the
smell of marijuana and the discovery of an envelope marked "supergold." Id. at 456. Rob-
bins involved virtually the same facts, the smell of marijuana and the discovery of a vial of
liquid; but in Robbins, the search preceded the arrest. Both cases involved probable cause to
search as well as arrest; thus reliance on the fact of arrest in Belton attests to the current
disagreement on the Court with respect to the permissible scope of vehicular searches.
168. 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)).
169. Id. at 460-61. It should be noted that the Belton rule allowing searches incident to
vehicular arrests does not extend to the automobile's trunk.
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The Court's new approach leaves open too many questions and,
more important, it provides the police and the courts with too
few tools with which to find the answers.
Thus, although the Court concludes that a warrantless search
of a car may take place even though the suspect was arrested
outside the car, it does not indicate how long after the suspect's
arrest that search may validly be conducted. Would a warrant-
less search incident to arrest be valid if conducted five minutes
after the suspect left his car? Thirty minutes? Three hours?
Does it matter whether the suspect is standing in close proxim-
ity to the car when the search is conducted? Does it matter
whether the police formed probable cause to arrest before or af-
ter the suspect left his car? And why is the rule announced to-
day necessarily limited to searches of cars? What if a suspect is
seen walking out of a house where the police, peering in from
outside, had formed probable cause to believe a crime was being
committed? Could the police then arrest that suspect and enter
the house to conduct a search incident to arrest? Even assuming
today's rule is limited to searches of the "interior" of cars - an
assumption not demanded by logic - what is meant by "inte-
rior"? Does it include locked glove compartments, the interior of
door panels, or the area under the floorboards? Are special rules
necessary for station wagons and hatchbacks, where the luggage
compartment may be reached through the interior, or taxicabs,
where a glass panel might separate the driver's compartment
from the rest of the car? Are the only containers that may be
searched those that are large enough to be "capable of holding
another object"? Or does the new rule apply to any container,
even if it "could hold neither a weapon nor evidence of the crim-
inal conduct for which the suspect was arrested"?
The Court does not give the police any "bright-line" answers
to these questions. More important, because the Court's new
rule abandons the justifications underlying Chimel, it offers no
guidance to the police officer seeking to work out these answers
for himself.170
Not only does the Belton rule raise questions with respect to
searches incident to automobile arrests, the abandonment of the
170. Id. at 469-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The questions that Justice
Brennan raises can be answered only through careful analysis. See LaFave, supra note 13, at
327-28 n.114.
[Vol. 24:335
GOOD FAITH AND THE EXCLUSIONARY REMEDY
rationale of Chimel v. California,' noted by Justice Brennan,
raises questions with respect to other arrests as well. A majority of
the Court in Belton apparently adopted the view that the Chimel
rule, which permits the search of the immediate area surrounding
the arrestee, was designed to define an area that can be searched
rather than to be functionally limited to the area where the per-
sons arrested could actually reach to grab a weapon or evidence. 7 2
Under the former approach, the immediate area of the arrest could
be searched even though the arrestee was incapable of reaching a
weapon or evidence, because either immobilized or removed from
the area. In Belton, the majority adopted this broader view to pro-
vide a bright-line rule for the police to follow in the case of a vehic-
ular arrest. This obviously raises the question of whether this same
approach is to be applied in the case of other searches incident to
arrest also for the reason of providing the police with a clear
rule.17 3
The confusion created by Belton and its troublesome interplay
with Robbins v. California7 4 led the Supreme Court last term to
consider and decide United States v. Ross.27 The search in Ross
went beyond the Belton rule 6 and thus gave the Court a chance
to reconsider Robbins, this time in the context of the search of a
brown paper bag. 77 To harmonize Robbins and Belton and provide
consistency and clarity to the automobile/closed container dichot-
omy, a majority of the Court in Ross held that closed containers
found in the lawful search of a vehicle can be opened without a
warrant.178 This rule appears to be as straightforward as is possi-
ble. It avoids the necessity of police reliance on a preceding arrest
171. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
172. This is the debate that raged in the lower courts following the Chimel decision. See
LAFAv, supra note 152, at § 6.3(c).
173. Application of the Belton approach to other situations would lend validity to cases
such as People v. Perry, 47 ll. 2d 402, 266 N.E.2d 330 (1971), in which a dresser drawer and
a purse in defendant's motel room were searched following the defendant's arrest and re-
moval from the room.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 196-98.
175. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
176. The Belton "search incident to arrest" rule applies only to the interior of the vehicle.
The search in Ross, however, involved items found in the automobile's trunk.
177. A zippered leather pouch was also searched. 102 S. Ct. at 2160.
178. Id. at 2172.
1983]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
to justify a container search, and it treats all parts of the vehicle17 e
and all containers consistently.'" 0
Even the straightforward rule announced in Ross, however, has
one analytical and two practical ambiguities. On the practical side,
Justice Stevens' majority opinion emphasized the necessity of
probable cause to search the automobile as an antecedent justifica-
tion for the inspection of closed containers found inside. One issue
that this requirement creates is a clear necessity to distinguish be-
tween probable cause to search and probable cause to arrest. In the
latter case, assuming an arrest has taken place, only containers
found inside the vehicle can be searched under Belton. To search
the trunk and items discovered therein, probable cause to search
the car is required. Although probable cause to arrest generally will
also provide probable cause to search the vehicle, 181 this may not
always be the case.18 2 Thus, Ross still may leave officers with the
need to make fine distinctions in some cases.
More importantly, the Ross decision purports to distinguish
Chadwick and Sanders as cases in which probable cause existed
only to search the respective pieces of luggage. The majority opin-
ion noted that probable cause to search the vehicle did not exist
independently in Chadwick and Sanders, and the fact that the lug-
gage in these cases was seized from an automobile was merely coin-
cidental.8 ' This creates an interesting dichotomy for the police to
use and abuse. For example, if prior probable cause exists to search
a briefcase, the fact that it is placed in a vehicle does not justify its
warrantless search. Only when probable cause to search the car ex-
ists independently can the briefcase be searched without a war-
rant. This places police officers in the difficult position of having to
determine whether probable cause exists to search the automobile
or only the briefcase.
179. No distinction was made in Ross between the immediate interior of vehicles and
other repositories such as glove compartments and trunks.
180. The majority specifically refused to distinguish "worthy" from "unworthy" contain-
ers. 102 S. Ct. at 2171.
181. Compare, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (probable cause to search
also supplying probable cause to arrest) with Belton v. New York, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
(probable cause to arrest also supplying probable cause to search).
182. For example, the defendant may be arrested on an outstanding warrant and no inde-
pendent probable cause develops at the time of the arrest to search the vehicle.
183. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2166-67, 2168, 2172.
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Unless probable cause to search the vehicle develops indepen-
dently at the scene, it seems that an answer to this type of ques-
tion will depend on a case-by-case evaluation of the information
known to the police and the amount of time the suspect spends in
the vehicle prior to the stop. Every time a suspect enters a vehicle
carrying some type of satchel, or even wearing a trenchcoat, the
police, and later the courts, will have to engage in this kind of fac-
tual analysis with respect to the probable cause issue. The result of
this analysis is crucial, for under the Supreme Court's analysis in
Ross and its distinction of Chadwick and Sanders, if probable
cause is focused on a particular container, it cannot be searched
without a warrant even after it is placed in a vehicle. On the other
hand, if the facts and the nature of the crime provide probable
cause to search the car as well, the container can be inspected
without the necessity of obtaining a warrant. This obviously cre-
ates the potential for abuse by police who delay the encounter with
a suspect until a vehicle becomes involved, because the vehicle be-
comes a linchpin for the warrantless search of items the suspect
may have placed inside it. Thus, not only will police and the courts
have to evaluate the probable cause issue, but courts also will have
to consider the possibility of subterfuge. Consequently, although
Ross is the most radiant line the Supreme Court has drawn in the
automobile/container dichotomy thus far, it is not completely illu-
minating and fails to eliminate factual analysis in these cases in
favor of standardized procedure.
In addition to the pragmatic ambiguities left by the Supreme
Court's decision in Ross, the opinion also creates a major analytical
problem because it undermines the Court's fourth amendment pri-
vacy analysis. The Court has relied heavily on its privacy formula
in recent fourth amendment cases,'" and the effort in Ross to es-
tablish a bright-line rule creates a major confrontation with prior
decisions. The majority in Ross purports not to overrule Chadwick
and Sanders; however, as pointed out by Justice Marshall in his
dissent,185 Ross is blatantly inconsistent with the privacy rationale
of those prior cases. Chadwick and Sanders held that a legitimate
expectation of privacy attached to luggage and therefore a warrant
184. See Ashdown, supra note 9.
185. 102 S. Ct. at 2179-81 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
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was required in order to search it. Ross, however, held that when
such closed containers are placed in automobiles, they can be
searched without a warrant. Justice Marshall points out that the
Ross holding cannot be explained on a mobility notion because
such a theory was rejected in Chadwick and, in any event, contain-
ers, unlike vehicles, are not mobile.186 Additionally, custodial de-
tention of containers does not involve the same kind of inconve-
nience associated with the detention of automobiles.1 87
With regard to privacy, it must be assumed that the Supreme
Court has not abandoned its conclusion in Chadwick and Sanders
that a legitimate expectation of privacy generally applies to reposi-
tories of personal effects. The easiest explanation of Ross is that
this legitimate expectation of privacy is sacrificed when such an
item is placed in an automobile. In fact, this appears to be the
rationale behind the holding. 8 8 One's privacy expectations in per-
sonal satchels may depend on where the satchels are located or
where they are placed. This notion, however, fails to explain why a
legitimate expectation of privacy attaching to luggage is sacrificed
when the luggage is placed in a vehicle. Surely a piece of luggage
carried in public is less private than when it is placed in the trunk
of an automobile. Nevertheless, the majority in Ross suggests that
the luggage is protected by the warrant requirement in the former
case.189 Apparently, the Supreme Court's rather flexible privacy
approach has encountered a direct conflict with the Court's recent
interest in establishing bright-line rules to guide the police and ex-
pedite law enforcement.
B. Narrowing the Scope of the Fourth Amendment
The recent Robbins-Belton-Ross automobile trilogy exemplifies
186. Id. at 2179. (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2171-72.
189. The entire thrust of the Ross opinion is that personal containers, like luggage, be-
come vulnerable only when caught up in the probable cause search of an automobile. Justice
Stevens' majority opinion labors to distinguish United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), thereby generally preserving the legit-
imate expectation of privacy (and the warrant requirement) generally applicable to luggage.
Of course, luggage placed in a private residence does not need its own privacy umbrella for
warrant protection. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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the difficulty the Supreme Court has encountered in drafting
bright-line rules to guide the police. This difficulty has led to the
unfortunate complication of placing pressure on the fourth amend-
ment's substantive scope. While the Court has strived to eliminate
uncertainties and ambiguities from prior rules in order to provide
clear instructions to the police, the area of permissible police inves-
tigatory practices has expanded at the expense of fourth amend-
ment protection.
The demands of clarity offer a choice. Warrantless police prac-
tices can be circumscribed narrowly to permit only minimal intru-
sions so that the procedure will always be justified given the lim-
ited invasion. 190 Alternatively, a rule can be drawn broadly to cover
all situations in a particular category of investigatory work,
thereby eliminating the need for factual evaluation and judgment
by the police. Given the Supreme Court's law and order bent with
respect to search and seizure practices," 1 the Court has chosen the
latter course, consistently expanding the reach of detection proce-
dures in the name of clarification and expediency.
The first indication of this tendency to define police powers
broadly to avoid whatever uncertainty flows from case-by-case fac-
190. Examples might include a request to a motorist to get out of his vehicle following a
traffic stop, see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), or a brief encounter on the
street where a few questions are asked. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); Washington v. Chrisman, 455
U.S. 1 (1982); New York v. Belton, 443 U.S. 454 (1981); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692
(1981); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83
(1980); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620
(1980); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S.
463 (1980); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979);
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); An-
dresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976);
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976);
Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); United States v.
Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Gustafson v.
Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Cady v. Dom-
browski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Adams v. Wil-
liams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
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tual determinations came in United States v. Robinson.192 In
Robinson, the Supreme Court disagreed with the conclusion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that
the validity of a full search of the person following a custodial ar-
rest was dependent in each case on the need to disarm the suspect
or to discover evidence. The court of appeals held that because
only a traffic arrest was involved, there was no evidence to seize
and the search, therefore, was limited to a frisk for weapons. 193 In-
stead of adopting this straightforward rule permitting only
patdowns in the case of custodial arrests for traffic-type violations,
the Supreme Court chose to adopt a broader rule permitting a full
personal search in the case of all custodial arrests, thus avoiding
the need for officers to make judgments about the likely presence
of weapons or evidence in particular cases. 94 Although such a rule
has the virtue of relieving the police from making factual evalua-
tions and exercising judgment in custodial arrest situations, this
rule runs counter to several considered fourth amendment princi-
ples. 9" The majority in Robinson nevertheless felt that it was nec-
essary to provide the police with a rule for all occasions in which
an arrestee was to be taken into custody, and this was accom-
plished by drawing the rule broad enough to cover all custodial
arrests despite the potential for abuse.'96
The best example of the continual expansion of permissible po-
lice practices to give law enforcement a bright-line standard is the
recent Robbins-Belton-Ross automobile trilogy. Compounding the
lack of clarity already discussed, which arose from the individual
opinions in Robbins and Belton, 97 was the additional uncertainty
created by the interplay between the two cases. The plurality opin-
192. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
193. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd, 414 U.S. 218
(1973).
194. 414 U.S. at 235-36.
195. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For a
discussion of the conflict between the principles developed in these cases and the Robinson
decision, see Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Robinson. United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 248-59 (1973) (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas, J., and Brennan, J., dissenting).
196. The abuse would take the form of a subterfuge custodial arrest to undertake a full
personal search. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 154-73.
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ion in Robbins refused to permit the search of a closed, opaque
container found in a vehicle in the course of a probable cause
search, whereas the Belton rule permits the opening of closed con-
tainers found in the interior of an automobile following the arrest
of an occupant of the vehicle. Because the Belton decision was
based on an expansion of the permissible scope of a search incident
to a vehicular arrest, the search of a container taken from a vehicle
after Robbins and Belton had to be justified on the basis of a valid
preceding arrest. If the container search preceded the arrest, even
though both probable cause to arrest and search existed - which
will often be the case - the search would have been invalid under
Robbns.195 Given this less than rational and somewhat confusing
state of the law,199 the Supreme Court reconciled the two cases by
holding in Ross that closed containers discovered during the war-
rantless search of a vehicle could also be searched without a
warrant.
Ross eliminated the probable cause search/search incident to ar-
rest dichotomy and, most importantly, expanded the automobile
exception0 0 to include the search of closed containers found not
only in the interior of a vehicle, but also in the trunk. In an effort
to reconcile and clarify prior decisions, the Supreme Court in Ross
opted for an expansion of the rights of law enforcement officers in
an effort to provide a clear standard and thus avoid the need for
ad hoc judgments.
The Court is poised to go even further in the automobile area.
Certiorari recently was granted in a case dealing with the contro-
versial issue of whether a Terry patdown can extend to parts of the
198. Although searches occasionally have been validated as incident to an arrest even
though they preceded the arrest in point of time, see Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973);
People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1955), no attempt was made in Robbins to
justify the search on this ground.
199. Justice Stevens summarized this most forcefully. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
420, 444-53 (1981).
200. The so-called "automobile exception" refers to the doctrine permitting the probable
cause search of an automobile without the necessity of obtaining a warrant. See, e.g., Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583 (1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925).
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automobile after the suspect has been removed and frisked." 1 An
affirmative answer to this question to clearly delineate the permis-
sible practice in this context would not be surprising given the
Court's attitude toward automobiles. An expansive reading of the
right to frisk in the case of an automobile stop would make the
motorist subject to police scrutiny of his vehicle in the case of mere
suspicion, a clear expansion beyond the probable cause require-
ment of Belton and Ross.
There is no reason to suppose that the adoption of a good faith
exception to the exclusionary remedy operating in conjunction
with the Court's rule-oriented method of adjudication will relieve
this doctrinal pressure on the fourth amendment. The Supreme
Court's law enforcement bent in this area undoubtedly is tied to an
effort to avoid the operation of the exclusionary rule. Although the
good faith rule avoids the sanction of exclusion in the case of po-
lice good faith, findings of bad faith would still render evidence
inadmissible. If the good faith determination is to be presump-
tively based on compliance with a bright-line rule, the incentive to
draft the rules broadly to avoid findings of bad faith and the con-
sequent exclusion still will be present.
There is even reason to fear that the narrowing of the fourth
amendment and the expansion of investigatory practices will be
compounded if a good faith exception is in effect. With good faith
as the controlling issue, appellate courts will be reviewing most
fourth amendment questions in the context of appeals brought by
the government. Realizing that reasonableness is the focal point of
fourth amendment litigation under the good faith approach, crimi-
nal defendants are unlikely to press their fourth amendment
claims on appeal. The chances of success then would be reduced
well beyond even the current probabilities of victory on appeal, be-
cause arguing a fourth amendment violation alone would be insuf-
ficient; the police conduct also would have to be objectively unrea-
sonable. Consequently, most fourth amendment cases would reach
the appellate courts in the posture of the government seeking to
overturn a trial judge's finding of bad faith by arguing for an ex-
pansion of permissible law enforcement detection practices. Thus,
201. Michigan v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 320 N.W.2d 866, cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3287
(U.S. Oct. 12, 1982) (No. 82-256).
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the scales are pragmatically weighted in favor of a continued nar-
rowing of the fourth amendment.
V. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HORIZON: Illinois v. Gates
The United States Supreme Court appears poised in Illinois v.
Gates2a2 to adopt a good faith modification of the exclusionary
rule; hence we will soon know whether the scales have tipped in
favor of a narrowed fourth amendment. After Illinois v. Gates was
argued on the issue of whether probable cause could be supplied
by an anonymous informant who failed to indicate the source of
his information,20 3 the Supreme Court set the case for reargument
on the issue of whether the exclusionary rule "should to any extent
be modified, so as, for example, not to require the exclusion of evi-
dence obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure
at issue was consistent with the Fourth Amendment. '204 The facts
of Gates indicate why the Court chose it for consideration of this
issue. Unlike other cases where the good faith rule has been urged
on the Justices,0 5 the conduct of the police in Gates was based on
a reasonable interpretation of the law, and they acted on the au-
thority of a search warrant issued by a circuit judge. The case is
thus a perfect vehicle for recognition of the good faith principle.0 8
202. 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982) (mem.).
203. The case was first argued before the Court on October 13, 1982. On November 29,
1982, the Court issued an order asking the parties to reargue the case on the good faith
issue. 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982) (mem.).
204. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982) (mem.). This issue was argued before the
Court on March 1, 1983.
205. See Taylor v. Alabama, 102 S. Ct. 2664 (1982) (suppressing the defendant's confes-
sion where he was arrested without a warrant and without probable cause and taken to the
station for questioning). The majority dismissed the State's argument for a good faith ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule in a single sentence. See id. at 2669.
206. Apparently, the Supreme Court itself recognized this fact because following oral ar-
gument on the original probable cause issue, the Court set the case for reargument on the
good faith issue-a question the Court previously and unanimously had refused the State
permission to argue. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 436, 437 (1982) (mem.) (Stevens, J., joined
by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting from restoration of the case to the calendar for
reargument).
One commentator, however, after observing the oral arguments on the good faith issue,
questioned whether Gates was an appropriate case in which to recognize a good faith excep-
tion. Under Illinois law, trial courts must test the facial sufficiency of search warrants
against a probable cause standard. Thus, adopting a good faith exception to the exclusion-
ary rule may be irrelevant in this case. Lauter, Did the Court Pick the Wrong Case?, Nat'l
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In Gates, the police department of Bloomingdale, Illinois re-
ceived an anonymous, handwritten letter indicating that Lance
and Sue Gates were drug dealers travelling back and forth to Flor-
ida to purchase drugs to sell in their Bloomingdale home.20 7 The
Bloomingdale Police Department, with the aid of a detective of the
Chicago Police Department and an agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), verified much of the detail in the anony-
mous letter. The Gates' address provided by the informant was
correct, and on May 5, 1978 Lance Gates was, indeed, booked on a
flight to West Palm Beach, Florida, where the informant indicated
Lance would meet his wife who had driven down a few days earlier
to obtain drugs. The informant's letter stated that the car would
then be driven back to the Chicago area loaded with drugs. The
DEA agent in Florida confirmed that Lance Gates had arrived in
West Palm Beach and taken a cab to a Holiday Inn and entered a
room registered to his wife. The agent then informed the Bloom-
ingdale police that Gates and a woman had left the room and had
driven away in a red and gray Mercury with 1978 Illinois license
plates. The plate number proved to be registered to Lance B.
Gates, but for a different automobile. 08
Based on the anonymous letter and verification of the informa-
L.J., Mar. 14, 1983, at 6.
207. The letter recited as follows:
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who strictly
make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on
Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. Most of their buys are
done in Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida where she leaves it to
be loaded up with drugs then Lance flys [sic] down and drives it back. Sue flys
[sic] back after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down
there again and Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At the
time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with over $100,000.00
in drugs. Presently they have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their
basement.
They brag about the fact that they never have to work, and make their en-
tire living on pushers.
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They are
friends with some big drug dealers, who visit their house often.
Lance & Sue Gates
Greenway
in Condominiums
People v. Gates, 423 N.E.2d 887, 888 (Ill. 1981).
208. Id. at 888-89.
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tion provided in it, Detective Mader of the Bloomingdale Police
Department acquired a search warrant from a circuit judge of
DuPage County, Illinois for the Gates' residence in Bloomingdale
and the car they were driving in Florida. The warrant was exe-
cuted early the following morning as Lance and Susan Gates re-
turned to their home in Bloomingdale. The trunk of the Mercury
contained approximately 350 pounds of marijuana; additionally,
weapons, ammunition, more drugs, and drug paraphernalia were
discovered in the Gates' residence.20
Although the affidavit on which the warrant was based did not
satisfy the specific probable cause requirements of Aguilar v.
Texas2 1 -the anonymous letter did not indicate how the informa-
tion was acquired and there was no evidence of the general reliabil-
ity of the informant-the details in the letter had been indepen-
dently verified by law enforcement authorities. Thus, the affidavit
arguably fell within Draper v. United States211 and Spinelli v.
United States,"2 in which the Supreme Court indicated that prob-
able cause for the issuance of a warrant could be supplied from a
detailed informant's tip coupled with independent corroboration of
the information provided.
Nevertheless, the Illinois courts held that the anonymous letter
did not contain sufficient detail to establish that the informant had
acquired his information in a reliable way.213 Additionally, the Illi-
nois appellate court held that corroboration of the information
supplied by the informant could not satisfy the reliability aspect of
the Aguilar standard.1 4 Although both the Illinois appellate
court2'1 5 and the Illinois Supreme Court2 6 acknowledged the gen-
eral disagreement over the effect of corroboration on the probable
cause question, the Illinois Supreme Court held that it need not
consider the issue because the corroborative evidence was "only of
209. Id.
210. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
211. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
212. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
213. People v. Gates, 403 N.E.2d 77, 80-81 (I1. App. 1980), a'd, 423 N.E.2d 887, 893 (Ill.
1981).
214. 403 N.E.2d at 81 (Ill. App. 1980).
215. People v. Gates, 403 N.E.2d 77, 81 (Ill. App. 1980).
216. People v. Gates, 423 N.E.2d 887, 893 (Ill. 1981).
19831
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
clearly innocent activity" and therefore insufficient to satisfy either
of Aguilar's requirements.2 17 This conclusion appears erroneous
given the fact that the corroboration in Draper v. United States21s
was also of innocent activity.
219
Recognition of the uncertainty about the effect of corroboration
on the probable cause issue together with the Illinois Supreme
Court's questionable conclusion about the corroboration of facts
themselves innocent, points out that the police conduct in Gates
was at worst a reasonable mistake of law. In addition, the fact that
Detective Mader sought and obtained a search warrant makes his
behavior all the more innocent and reasonable. Thus, the uncer-
tainty of the law coupled with the use of the warrant procedure
makes Illinois v. Gates the perfect case for the adoption of good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
The pressure on the fourth amendment created by dissatisfac-
tion with the exclusionary rule seems to be entering a new phase
marked primarily by two phenomena: bright-line rules and the
good faith notion. Regardless of whether there is an ultimate mar-
riage of these two concepts to restrict further the exclusionary
remedy and facilitate the operation of the good faith system, the
rule-oriented direction of fourth amendment adjudication already
seems established. If, as appears to be the case, all hedges are to be
made in favor of law enforcement in the process of drafting
straightforward rules for the police to follow, we can only hope for
some ameliorative factor to soften the impact on the fourth
amendment as a mediator between the police and the public.
A good faith exception possibly could relieve some of the pres-
sure on the fourth amendment created by the exclusionary rule.
This could happen in one of two ways. If the good faith issue is
217. Id.
218. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
219. The details verified in Draper were that Draper would return to Denver from Chi-
cago on one of two specified days, Draper's physical description and the clothing he was
wearing, that he would be carrying "a tan zipper bag," and that he habitually "walked real
fast." Id. at 309-10. From this, the Supreme Court concluded that the federal agent was
justified in concluding that the rest of the informant's information-that Draper would have
heroin in his possession-was acquired in a reliable way and therefore true. Id. at 313.
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addressed without resolving whether a constitutional violation in
fact occurred, police conduct often would be upheld as reasonable,
avoiding the need to further narrowly tailor the fourth amendment
to suit the particular law enforcement activity in question. Alter-
natively, if violation of the fourth amendment is determined before
the good faith issue is reached, sound search-and seizure rules giv-
ing due consideration to individual privacy interests could be de-
veloped given the realization that the exclusionary rule neverthe-
less can be avoided by a finding of good faith. In other words, the
good faith exception could be viewed as diminishing the need for
an expansive view of permissible police practices.
If the Supreme Court adopts the good faith approach in Gates,
presumably it will tell us how the standard is to be applied. Of
necessity, the Court will be forced to indicate whether the fourth
amendment question is to be decided before the good faith issue is
reached. If the Court first rules that the search warrant in Gates
was invalid due to the failure of the supporting affidavit to estab-
lish probable cause, and then concludes that the evidence never-
theless will survive the exclusionary rule because of the good faith
of those involved,220 the Court will have indicated to lower courts
that the fourth amendment issue is to be resolved at the outset.221
Hopefully, the Court will say this expressly as did the federal dis-
trict judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania in a case re-
cently employing the good faith approach.222 Answering the under-
lying search and seizure question before addressing the good faith
issue will protect the future development of fourth amendment
law, and, at the same time, should encourage courts to take a more
expansive view of fourth amendment rights because the exclusion
220. It seems obvious that any good faith rule would also require the good faith of the
judge or magistrate who issued a warrant. The police and prosecution should not be insu-
lated from the exclusion of evidence by authority of a search warrant issued in bad faith.
221. Conceivably, the Court could simply uphold the search based on the good faith of
those involved without answering the underlying fourth amendment issue. However, to
reach the good faith question, the Court, at least implicitly, has to recognize the questiona-
ble validity of the search warrant. Otherwise, they could have upheld the search under the
authority of the warrant (the issue on which certiorari originally was granted) without the
need of addressing the good faith question (the issue on which the case was set for reargu-
ment). Given this procedural scenario, if the Court ultimately adopts a good faith rule, it is
likely they will resolve the fourth amendment question first.
222. United States v. Nolan, 530 F. Supp. 386, 398 n.16 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
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of evidence then can be avoided by application of the good faith
principle.
